Treasurer Michael Ferguson and Vice-Chancellor Rufus Black – should resign, or be sacked

1. Key points

Section 7(2) of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 (UTAS Act) states:

“…the University is not to exercise its power to borrow money unless it has first obtained the written approval of the Treasurer.”

Documents released by Tasmanian Treasury under Right to Information (RTI) on 11 August 2023 definitively show that, in borrowing $350 million through its Green Bond program in March 2022, UTAS was in breach of the terms and conditions of its most recent borrowing approvals from the Tasmanian Treasurer and therefore in breach of Section 7(2) the UTAS Act.

This breach constitutes a serious legal, financial and reputational risk to UTAS, the Tasmanian Government and the people of Tasmania.

If steps have not already been taken by the UTAS Council and the Tasmanian Government to remedy this situation, by issue of a borrowing approval tailored to the Green Bond and UTAS’ current borrowing arrangements generally, which supersedes previous borrowing approvals, they should be initiated immediately.

The Green Bond mess was brought about by gross incompetence.  That it was/has been allowed to continue can only be seen as a result of either stupidity, arrogance, recklessness, negligence or dereliction of responsibility, or some combination thereof.

Vice-Chancellor (VC) Rufus Black and Treasurer Michael Ferguson have prime responsibility for the creation and/or continuation of the Green Bond mess and should resign from office.

Others involved should seriously consider their positions.

If UTAS and the Government have proven so inept on UTAS’ $350 million Green Bond, what trust can there be in UTAS’ proposed $4 billion relocation to the Hobart CBD and redevelopment of the Sandy Bay campus site?

Taking the Green Bond mess together with the inevitable financial crisis confronting UTAS, if it continues with its CBD move, there is a strong case for establishment of a Royal Commission.

2. The Green Bond breaches the UTAS Act

In March 2022, UTAS borrowed $350 million in long-term debt through the debt market, from mostly unidentified lenders, through its Green Bond program. This comprised $280 million of borrowings due for repayment in 2032 and $70 million of borrowings due for repayment in 2042.

  • UTAS also established a short-term debt facility for $50 million with the ANZ Bank.

  • UTAS’ debt issuance program was conducted on 15 March 2022. The 10- and 20-year terms commenced on settlement date, 24 March 2022.

It can now be stated categorically, with full documentary evidence, that UTAS Green Bond borrowing was in breach of the terms and conditions of the two borrowing approvals issued by then State Treasurer (and Premier), Peter Gutwein, on which UTAS relied.

  • Both UTAS Vice Chancellor, Rufus Black, and the Tasmanian Treasurer, Michael Ferguson have sought to create an impression that UTAS’ Green Bond borrowing was based on valid approvals and have acted as if it was. I consider their role in the Green Bond mess in section 5, Responsibility and accountability, below.

  • Treating the two approvals as a legitimate basis for the Green Bond is like (knowingly) relying on an ordinary car driver’s licence to drive a B-Double from Melbourne to Sydney.  See how far you get, the size of the fines and what other penalties you attract.

  • I lodged an RTI application with the Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance (Treasury) on 22 November 2022. Following Treasury’s initial decision on 10 March 2023 with 42 pages of records (Treasury 1), I requested an internal review of that decision. On 11 August 2023, I received Treasury’s review decision with 207 pages of records (Treasury 2).

Here is the first of the two approvals on which UTAS is relying – an approval letter signed by the then Treasurer (and Premier), Peter Gutwein on 19 November 2019, obtained from Treasury as part of its RTI decision on 11 August 2023 (document at Treasury 2, p34):

It will be seen that this is an approval to increase UTAS’ medium-term borrowing facility with the Tasmanian Public Finance Corporation (Tascorp), a statutory body corporate of the State of Tasmania, to $200 million (it was then $175 million). It is not an approval to borrow $200 million on a long-term basis though the debt market.

  • Medium-term borrowings are generally understood to between 12 months and five years. See for example this article. Borrowings for a longer period requires a long-term borrowing approval.

  • Records released by Treasury on 11 August 2023 show that, at least, some staff in Treasury and UTAS well understood the difference between a medium- and long-term borrowing approval and that borrowing for a period longer than five years, would require an updated long-term borrowing approval superseding earlier borrowing approvals.  See section 4, UTAS (and the Government) knew better, below.

Here is the second of the two approvals on which UTAS is relying – an approval letter signed by Mr Gutwein on 3 March 2021, obtained from Treasury as part of its initial RTI decision on 10 March 2023 (originally obtained with Treasury 1, but included with Treasury 2, p178):

I have discussed this document in a number of my previous blog posts and repeat all my points, with the force of absolute certainty:

  • The language of the conditional approval was clearly predicated on UTAS borrowing the additional $200 million from Tascorp. Note the phrase, “the increase of $200 million to the existing borrowing facility limit” in the second dot point.

  • A loan from Tascorp is a facility but in market usage, a debt capital raise is not. Note the use of “borrowing facility” four times and “funding facility” once in in the letter.

  • A conditional approval for a $200 million borrowing cannot possibly be held as valid for the Green Bond borrowing of $350 million. I have repeatedly made this point, but now it can be seen that the borrowing approval of 19 November 2019 was not valid for the Green Bond, it carries even greater force.

  • If, solely for the sake of argument, it was allowed that UTAS had borrowing approvals for $400 million, it is an open question whether that figure was exceeded in the refinancing process. Did UTAS’ new borrowings in March 2022 overlap with UTAS’ previous Tascorp borrowing?

The documents released by Treasury under RTI on 11 August 2023 raise a further, and very major, issue.

Here is the maturity profile provided by UTAS and mentioned in the third dot point condition of Mr Gutwein’s approval letter of 3 March 2021 (Treasury 2, p83):

This profile clearly only provides for the borrowing of $325 million term debt at most.

Even if, solely for the sake of argument, it was granted that the borrowing approval of 19 November 2019 had provided an appropriate legal basis to borrow $200 million of the Green Bond debt, and there were no other issues relating to the terms and conditions of Mr Gutwein’s borrowing approval of 3 March 2021, UTAS has a borrowing approval for $325 million, not $350 million of term debt.

This is extremely serious. While I believe that any of the points above would undo UTAS/the Tasmanian Government in court, the fact that UTAS has borrowed $25 million more through the Green Bond than was contemplated in UTAS’ own documentation is enough alone to ‘sink’ UTAS and the Government in court.

3. Why this matters

If UTAS’ proposed CBD move/Sandy Bay redevelopment goes ahead, it will lead to financial disaster with the State Government needing to provide a cash bail out, if UTAS is to survive. See my posts: UTAS’ proposed CBD relocation would lead to financial disaster and Tasmanians would bear cost of UTAS folly – $4 billion plus at stake.

As this disaster emerges, or even before then, the creditors for UTAS’ $350 million Green Bond debt would be likely to seek early repayment of their loans to UTAS. Creditors who may have bought the bonds in the secondary bond market may be particularly aggressive.

The State Government would have to pay out the $350 million (with penalties), and any resistance to this would end badly in court.

With the State Government’s total mishandling of the Green Bond obvious to all, Tasmania’s own credit rating could well be downgraded.

  • Payout of the debt would, of course, ultimately fall on the taxpayer.

  • The longer the State Government allows UTAS to go without a valid borrowing approval, the greater the legal risk to Tasmania.

If UTAS and the State Government have not recently acted to ensure that a valid Government approval is in place for the Green Bond (and recent statements by VC Black and Treasurer Ferguson suggest they have not), they should immediately act to ensure an approval tailored to the specific circumstances of the Green Bond is issued.

  • I just do not understand the delay in addressing this matter.

  • I wrote to the Secretary of Treasury, Tony Ferrall, and the Acting Tasmanian Auditor-General, Jonathan Wassell, on 4 April, and VC Black on 6 April 2023, raising my concerns that UTAS’ Green Bond borrowing lacked a valid government approval (this is a copy of the email to VC Black). I did not receive a reply from Mr Ferrall or VC Black. I received a pro forma response from the Tasmanian Audit Office.  Mr Wassell did not reply to a second email I sent him on 5 April 2023.

  • Having raised my concerns about the Green Bond with these parties, if find it disturbing that UTAS’ annual report for 2022 was able to be tabled in Parliament on 22 June 2023 as if nothing was wrong. Among other things, this report included the incorrect statement that “The University operates under a borrowing limit established by the Treasurer of the State of Tasmania, the limit as at 31 December 2022 is $400 million.” (UTAS Annual Report 2022, p71). To repeat, UTAS was not operating under borrowing approvals issued by Treasurer. It was operating in breach of approvals. I comment further on the annual report in section 5, Responsibility and accountability (sub-heading Auditor General), below.

  • To allow the running sore of the Green Bond mess to continue to fester would represent unconscionably reckless behaviour on the part of the Tasmanian Government in particular.

4. UTAS (and the Government) knew better

It can be anticipated that as the Green Bond mess unfolds, as it surely will, UTAS will say that it did not know any better, it thought its approvals were all in order for the Green Bond and, if its approvals were not in order, then Treasury/the Treasurer should have alerted it to this fact.

I certainly agree Treasury and the Treasurer hold a large share of blame in the Green Bond mess, and I will return to this, but the documents released by Treasury under RTI on 19 August 2023 show that, at least some, UTAS staff knew well what an appropriate approval would entail.

With the dust scarcely settled on Mr Gutwein’s approval letter of 19 November 2019, VC Black wrote again to Mr Gutwein seeking a new borrowing approval on 12 December 2019 (Treasury 2, pp32-33):

Clearly, by 12 December 2019, UTAS had reached a view that it would require additional borrowing, and that all its borrowing for the move, should be on a long-term basis.

 VC Black’s letter therefore sought “approval for a $300 million long term debt facility” by 30 June 2020, with the new approval intended to supersede, rather than add to, the previous $200 million medium-term borrowing facility with Tascorp.

VC Black’s letter was subject to consideration by Treasury and Mr Gutwein replied on 6 February 2020 seeking further information (Treasury 2, pp38-39).

Matters were then complicated with issues over Covid and the Tasmanian Government providing a guarantee of state institutions borrowing facilities with Tascorp, including UTAS $200 million borrowing facility with Tascorp. This is the point, apparently, at which matters totally fouled up.  When VC Black next wrote to Mr Gutwein about borrowing approvals, it was to “to explore the possibility of increasing the State Government guarantee by a further $200 million” (Treasury 2, p48). 

I have written on subsequent developments at length and will only note here that subsequently:

  • The Government indicated that it would approve an increase in UTAS’ borrowing facility of $200 million but declined to extend the guarantee to this amount.

  • There was a breakdown in UTAS’ relationship with Tascorp over security arrangements for a potential $400 million facility (with $200 million guaranteed).

  • Instead of dealing with Tascorp, UTAS decided to refinance in the market and forfeit its Government guarantee for $200 million of its debt.

Amidst developments it appears to have been completely forgotten/neglected within UTAS and Treasury that the borrowing approval of 19 November 2019, being for a medium-term debt facility with Tascorp, was unfit for the purpose for the Green Bond and that both the 19 November 2019 and 3 March 2021 borrowing approvals related to a borrowing facility with Tascorp.

  • In line with VC Black’s (competently worded) request of 18 December 2019 for “approval for a $300 million long term debt facility” to supersede then current approvals, before UTAS approached the market with the Green Bond, VC Black should have sought a long-term borrowing approval for a $350 million that superseded previous approvals. 

Perhaps there were some changes in personnel in UTAS and Treasury that allowed this situation to occur (names of some key UTAS/Treasury officers are redacted in the relevant Treasury 2 papers), but the incompetence of UTAS and Treasury, at an institutional level, in this matter beggars belief.

5. Responsibility and accountability

As previously indicated, the Green Bond mess poses serious risk to UTAS, the Tasmanian Government and the people of Tasmania.

I will now consider the issues of responsibility and accountability, including who is to blame for the Green Bond mess and who needs to fix it NOW. The easiest way to do this is to look at the key institutional players.

UTAS

VC Black

VC Black was the UTAS officer with lead responsibility for the flawed Green Bond process, exposing all Tasmanians to financial risk (see, for example, UTAS Council Minutes for 23 February 2022, p258 where authority was delegated to him), and if he did not know what he was doing, he should have made sure he did, as the CEO of one of Tasmania’s largest ‘enterprises’.

  • VC Black apparently did not understand his own letter to Mr Gutwein of 18 December 2019 and why it was drafted the way it was.

VC Black also gave error ridden and misleading evidence on the Green Bond and other debt issues to the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 (LegCo Inquiry) on 4 May 2023. When Meg Webb MLC questioned him about whether UTAS’s $350 million Green Bond was of such a kind as to warrant Government borrowing approval. VC Black replied:

“Green bond is borrowing, and our ability to do that was based on 3 March 2021, then Treasurer Peter Gutwein issued a letter to the university granting approval for a $200 million increase in our borrowing limits subject to the [three conditions set by Treasurer Gutwein]….We met all three of those conditions.” [my bolding]

  • VC Black’s words clearly suggest that UTAS’ entire $350 Green Bond borrowing rested on Treasurer Gutwein’s letter of 3 March 2021, which as discussed above only provided a highly conditional approval for a $200 million increase in UTAS existing borrowing facility with Tascorp.

There can be only four reasons for VC Black’s errors:

  • VC Black was trying to bluff his way through the LegCo Inquiry in relation to the validity of UTAS’ borrowing approval.

  • Notwithstanding his role in the Green Bond process, VC Black did not know what he was talking about.

  • VC Black was poorly briefed.

  • Some combination of the preceding factors.

VC Black should immediately apologise to the LegCo Inquiry and correct the record (failure to do so could represent contempt).

VC Black should then resign as VC of UTAS or be removed by the UTAS Council.

The UTAS Council in 2020 and early 2021

As detailed in the “Timeline of major events” and “Appendix 2 – Excerpts from UTAS Council Minutes” in Green Bombshell – RTI documents indicate UTAS broke own law, the UTAS Council was extensively involved in consideration of UTAS debt and borrowing issues throughout 2020 and early 2021.

The fact that UTAS Council Minutes indicate that no-one on the Council gave thought to their legal obligations to ensure a valid approval from the Treasurer was in place in the lead up to UTAS’ issuance of the Green Bond on 15 March 2022 is a damning indictment of that body.

If there is one thing that UTAS Council members should be concerned about, above all else, it is their compliance with the law. In particular, Council members could reasonably have been expected to know UTAS’ legal obligations under the UTAS Act and to have sought assurance from Management that those legal obligations had been met. I suggest UTAS Council members who failed to ensure that UTAS was meeting its most fundamental legal obligations with respect to the Green Bond should carefully consider their position on the Council. This applies doubly to any UTAS Council member who was sitting on the responsible UTAS committee advising Council at the time – probably the Finance Committee.

UTAS Council Members at the date the Green Bond went to market, who are still serving on the UTAS Council are:

  • Alison Watkins AM (commenced on UTAS Council 25 June 2021)

  • Rufus Black (commenced 1 March 2018)

  • Professor Natalie Brown (1 February 2019)

  • James Groom (commenced 1 January 2019)

  • Sheree Vertigan AM (commenced 30 April 2021)

  • Tara Howell (commenced 30 April 2021)

  • Professor Peter Dawkins AO (commenced 1 July 2021)

  • Sarah-jane Hall (commenced 1 January 2022)

  • Alicia Leis (commenced 11 February 2022)

UTAS Council members, who had only recently commenced in their positions at the time of the Green Bond issuance on 15 March 2023, may have some excuse for their failings in this matter, particularly given UTAS Management’s propensity to produce voluminous board papers, in which key issues may not be readily apparent. 

The current UTAS Council

As a matter of urgency, the current UTAS Council (or those who remain) should ensure a valid borrowing approval is sought from the Treasurer for the Green Bond as soon as possible.

They should also conduct a review of the process which saw UTAS breach the UTAS Act and continue to remain in breach.

The Tasmanian Government and agencies

The State Government also appears as completely derelict in the Green Bond mess.

If it was aware that UTAS was about to break the law in issuing the Green Bond, the Government should have taken action to remind UTAS of its legal obligations prior to the Bond issue and advise it to seek the requisite approval under the UTAS Act.

If it was taken unaware (and it would have to be asked how this could be so), it should have rebuked UTAS for seemingly borrowing without adequate approval and ensured a valid borrowing approval was put in place for UTAS’ debt as soon as possible.

  • I lodged a further RTI application with Treasury on 18 August 2023, to try to find out what has been going on within the Government about the Green Bond mess since the Bond was issued.

The Treasurer (and Premier) at the time of the Green Bond issuance, Peter Gutwein

As Treasurer, Peter Gutwein signed the two approvals on which UTAS relied for its Green Bond issuance.

If he paid any attention to what he was signing, Mr Gutwein should have realised that UTAS’ Green Bond issuance breached the terms and conditions of his approvals.

Despite the fact that he has retired, his role in the Green Bond mess warrants investigation, as does that of his successor and the Government generally.

The current Treasurer, Michael Ferguson

Mr Ferguson assumed office as Treasurer in April 2022 and should be well across his portfolio responsibilities by now. Instead of taking a long hard look at the financial issues associated with UTAS’ proposed CBD move, including the Green Bond, his approach has, on the kindest reading, been one of insouciant neglect and unquestioning acceptance of everything UTAS says.

On 6 July 2023, Mr Fergson appeared before the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992. In his opening statement, the Treasurer made a point of saying that:

“Over the period to March 2021, the former Treasurer [Peter Gutwein] provided a series of approvals in relation to borrowings by the university, supported by robust analysis by the Department of Treasury and Finance. The university currently has an approved borrowing limit of $400 million.” (transcript, page 1).

In answer to a question in the House of Assembly from Kristy Johnston MHA on UTAS’ finances on 16 August 2023, Mr Ferguson stated among other things:

“I invite you, Ms Johnston, to reconsider the way you might have come to this question. There is no concern that I hold in respect of the university’s finances. I made this clear at the recent Legislative Council inquiry hearing where I was quite happy to attend and provide evidence to make that point. I also made the further point that when the former treasurer, Mr Gutwein, approved borrowings, he did so on the basis of advice from his department, the Department of Treasury and Finance, the same people who advise me today.” (copy of transcript; broadcast of Question Time video, 34 minutes in)

I believe that Mr Ferguson clearly misled the LegCo Inquiry, while under oath, by saying:

“The university currently has an approved borrowing limit of $400 million”. [my bolding]

As has been detailed above, UTAS lacked a valid borrowing approval for the Green Bond and clearly breached the terms and conditions of the two approvals on which it relied.

Mr Ferguson’s language in the House of Assembly, either deliberately or by luck, was vaguer. He was not asked, and he did not comment on whether UTAS’ Green Bond borrowings met the terms and conditions of the borrowing approvals on which UTAS placed reliance.  He also made a point of acknowledging (blaming?) Treasury.

However, this does not ‘let him off the hook’.’ As Treasurer, a key part of Mr Ferguson’s job is to protect the financial interests of Tasmania. 

I wrote directly to him (and the Premier) by email on 5 July 2023 raising my concerns about the financial implications of UTAS’ proposed CBD relocation and my concern that UTAS lacked a valid approval for the Green Bond, with links to relevant blogs both by myself and public policy analyst John Lawrence. Mr Ferguson has not yet responded.

Even if Mr Ferguson did not see my email (or dismissed it), questioning by Ms Webb, and others, in the LegCo on 6 July 2023 should have roused his curiosity and concern to check all was well with the Green Bond and UTAS’ finances generally. He should have asked to see the borrowing approvals on which UTAS’ was relying.

If Mr Ferguson did ask to see the borrowing approvals, and he did not realise there was a problem, he is clearly not up to the office of Treasurer. If he did not ask to see the borrowing approvals, he stands guilty of wilful negligence.

Either way, Mr Ferguson should provide a correction to the LegCo inquiry and, arguably, correct or clarify his answer to  Ms Johnston. He should then resign, as the accountable Minister for the Green Bond mess.

The Premier, Jeremy Rockliff

I have not found any evidence of direct involvement by Mr Rockliff in the Green Bond mess in documents released by Treasury under RTI.

However, as the Head of Government, Mr Rockliff has ultimate responsibility for the Green Bond mess.  He should seek to ensure it is fixed as soon as possible.  If Mr Ferguson does not resign, Mr Rockliff should seek his resignation.

As noted above, I addressed my email of 5 July 2023 to both Mr Rockliff and Mr Ferguson.

I received an interim response on 12 July 2023. I have yet to receive a final response.

Treasury

While not excusing either Mr Gutwein or Mr Ferguson, they had/have a right to expect accurate briefing.

Treasury’s failure to consider the issue of whether UTAS’ issuance of the Green Bond accorded with the wording of the two borrowing approvals on which UTAS relied is bewildering, but loss of corporate memory or some such will not wash as an excuse for not seeking to rectify the situation. As I have mentioned, I wrote to the Secretary of Treasury, Mr Tony Ferrall, alerting him to the Green Bond issue on 4 April 2023.  I received no response, but it seems there was no follow up within Treasury either, as not only did Treasury apparently provide incorrect briefing to Mr Ferguson for his error ridden appearance at the LegCo Inquiry on 6 July 2023, but it made its own errant contribution to the hearing. Treasury Deputy Secretary Fiona Calvert, who was accompanying Mr Ferguson, referring to the second (3 March 2021) borrowing approval relied on by UTAS for the Green Bond, stated:

  “It was an increase from a $200 million limit to the $400 million limit. It was agnostic as to what form of borrowing that they used. When we were originally assessing that, I think the expectation was that the university would continue to borrow through the Tasmanian Public Finance Corporation [Tascorp] but they subsequently decided to go down the green bond route.“ (transcript, page 9)

Did it never occur/has it never occurred to Ms Calvert, or Treasury more generally, even with my prompting and the LegCo Inquiry’s interest in the matter, to look at the wording of the two borrowing approvals on which UTAS relied and to ask whether UTAS had observed that wording?

The Auditor-General

As noted, I wrote to the acting Tasmanian Auditor-General, Mr Wassell, about the Green Bond mess on 4 April 2023.  I also raised specific issues about the Audit-Office’s audit of UTAS’ accounts for 2022 in an email of 6 April 2023 and received no response.

As became clear, when UTAS tabled its annual report for 2022 in Parliament on 22 June 2023, the Tasmanian Audit Office had already signed off UTAS’ accounts on 7 March 2023.

Among other things, the auditor’s report stated:

“Responsibilities of the Council for the Financial Report

The Council is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial report in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and the financial reporting requirements of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 and Division 60 of the Australian Charities and Notfor-profits Commission Act 2012 and for such internal control as determined necessary to enable the preparation of the financial report that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. In preparing the financial report, the Council is responsible for assessing the Group’s ability to continue as a going concern, disclosing, as applicable, matters related to going concern and using the going concern basis of accounting unless the Council intend to liquidate the Group or to cease operations, or have no realistic alternative but to do so.

Auditor’s Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Report

My objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial report as a whole is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an auditor’s report that includes my opinion….” (UTAS Annual Report 2022, p109; my bolding in body of text)

As already noted, UTAS’ financial statements include, among other things, this ‘material misstatement’:

“The University operates under a borrowing limit established by the Treasurer of the State of Tasmania, the limit as at 31 December 2022 is $400 million.” (UTAS Annual Report 2022, p71)

As shown throughout this post, UTAS did not just lack a valid borrowing approval, it breached the terms and conditions of the borrowing approvals it had and therefore the UTAS Act.

In light of my email of 6 April 2023, I believe the Tasmanian Audit Office should have reconsidered its audit report as a matter of urgency.

Having failed to do so, it should issue a correction and take whatever other remedial action is required as soon as possible.

Reading the audit report also reinforces the failures of the UTAS Council, which approved UTAS annual report for 2022, and particularly VC Black and Chancellor Watkins, who signed off on UTAS’ financial statements being in order when in fact they contained major errors on UTAS’ borrowings.

The Tasmanian Parliament

I copied my email to Mr Rockliff and Mr Ferguson of 5 July 2023 to all Members of the House of Assembly, and others.

I variously received substantive responses from members or their offices (not many); automated/pro forma responses from members or their offices; or no response at all.

I suggest it is time for the House of Assembly, and the Tasmanian Parliament as a whole, to lift its act on the Green Bond mess and the financial situation of UTAS generally.

The Green Bond mess and UTAS’ looming financial crisis will not go away by themselves.

By : Robert Hogan

1 Comment

  1. I believe the UTAS Senior Executive have now moved into the Forestry/Freedom furniture site. Amid a building site rather than staff and students. May they contemplate this ‘green mess’ along with the all the other ways in which the uni is failing.

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