Preliminary comments:

  • When I refer to UTAS in my writings, I am generally referring only to the senior decision makers in the University rather than the University, or the staff of the University, in general. My meaning can normally be judged from the context.

  • While I mention UTAS moving parts of the university from the Sandy Bay campus to the Hobart CBD (frequently pre-empting formal consideration of the long-term future of the southern campus), this in no way indicates that I believe that the CBD move is a fait accompli. I believe that the rest of the proposed move can and should be stopped and that work on the Forestry Building should be immediately halted, pending an independent and transparent review of options for UTAS’ southern campus, with a meaningful process of community consultation.

  • UTAS commissioned research by Deloitte Access Economic (DAE) to support the CBD move last year (mentioned on page of 8 of Attachment 1 of Part 13 of UTAS’ submission to the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 – the LegCo Inquiry). I have submitted a Right to Information (RTI) application for this research, but believe that UTAS should immediately make the research available to the public so that it can be scrutinised.

Introduction

In an article in the Mercury on 26 January 2022, Simon Longstaff praised UTAS Vice-Chancellor (VC) Rufus Black as:

a visionary leader [who] would only pursue a course of action if he sincerely believed it to be in the public interest” and

a person of the highest integrity

The strong message in Longstaff’s article is that: (1) VC Black has a vision for UTAS’ proposed CBD move; (2) is a highly credible person; and (3) there is (therefore) a strong case for the move (that is, you should trust such a man).

I won’t dwell on the third assertion here, as Longstaff’s article, like UTAS’ public case, is essentially an evidence free zone (a good reason for UTAS to publish the DAE research immediately). Instead, I will focus on the first and second points in this article.

Whose ‘vision’ is the proposed CBD move anyway?

When talking about UTAS’ proposed CBD move, rather than it being a “vision” on the part of VC Black, it is much more accurate, as I have previously suggested, to talk of the ‘Rathjen-Hodgman-Hickey plan’ – a plan which all their successors have slavishly followed, with the possible exception of Anna Reynolds.

  • Piecemeal relocation commenced under VC Le Grew, but the process really only started moving forward as part of a coherent ‘vision’ under VC Rathjen with support, at least, from former Premier Will Hodgman and former Hobart Lord Mayor Sue Hickey. This is a matter on which I have written previously, including in my submission to the LegCo Inquiry and my blog post RTI papers reveal Government left governing to UTAS.

  • Based on reading of the UTAS Council Minutes recently released to me by UTAS under pressure from the Ombudsman (and published on the UTAS website in two parts – 2015-2018 and 2019-2022), I think it reasonable to give credit for the plan to another person and call it the ‘Rathjen-Field-Hodgman-Hickey plan’. In light of his column in the Mercury last year, I am sure former Labor Premier Michael Field would be happy to be so recognised anyway (see my blog posts Field of Nightmares, Field of Dreams Part 1 and Part 2).

  • Unlike Mr Longstaff, I have relied on primary (documentary) evidence in forming my views. Based on that evidence, I also consider the ‘Rathjen-Field-Hodgman-Hickey plan’ to be totally flawed (see my LegCo submission and all my blog posts).

Using newly released material, I intend to publish a full chronology of the development of the ‘Rathjen-Field-Hodgman-Hickey plan’ and its implementation in a later blog post, but I will highlight here some particular developments in 2017 – the critical period before the advent of VC Black.

VC Rathjen’s public statement

By the date of this article (complete copy here), 19 July 2017, VC Rathjen knew he would be shortly leaving for Adelaide, and was perhaps a bit franker than he might otherwise have been – particularly noteworthy are the paragraphs:

Vice chancellor Peter Rathjen said the buildings at the existing campus were not fit for purpose and a decision [on relocation] would have to be made ‘quite quickly’.

‘The big decision will be whether the University reinvests at Sandy Bay in which case it will be there for another 50 years or whether it chooses to build new facilities elsewhere which gives the opportunity to do something different’, Prof Rathjen said.

‘Many of the buildings at Sandy Bay are not fit for purpose for a University of our calibre, and they need to be replaced by buildings the calibre of the Menzies Institute or the IMAS Institute.’

But he said no decision had been made and it was matter for the University council.

The CBD move decision process was well underway in 2017

In that last sentence, VC Rathjen appeared to not want to be seen as pre-empting UTAS Council decisions, but I suspect this was more for public display than fear of treading on UTAS Council members’ toes or, at least, the majority of UTAS Council members’ toes.

By the date of the Mercury article, a process had already been set in train that would lead inexorably to the decision by the UTAS Council on 5 April 2019 to relocate the Sandy Bay campus to the Hobart CBD. Critical points in this process were reached by the end of 2017, well before VC Black’s advent.

This is fully documented in the UTAS Council Minutes for 2017, but for the sake of space, I will quote here only the most significant/telling references in the Minutes. (I recommend everyone to read the UTAS Council Minutes – the content is fascinating and informative; even what UTAS has chosen to redact is revealing).

I have not generally included references to the proposal to build a consolidated STEM facility in the Hobart CBD here as they would take up too much space, but it should be noted that a Business Case had been lodged with Infrastructure Australia in 2016 and this was very much VC Rathjen’s stalking horse for full CBD relocation (see RTI papers reveal Government left governing to UTAS)

The Minutes of the UTAS Council meeting on 31 March 2017 meeting include:

(NB: To view, see page 126 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

  • The members of the Built Environment and Infrastructure Committee (BEIC) throughout 2017 were Dr Peter Davis (Chair), VC Peter Rathjen, Mr David Button, Mrs Susan Chen, Professor Stephen Loo (until 30 May), Professor Ceridwen Owen (from 17 October) and Professor Elaine Stratford.

At the Members Only session of the UTAS Council meeting of 30 June 2017:

(NB: To view, see page 139 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

The Minutes of the UTAS Council meeting on 17 August 2017 include:

(NB: To view, see page 139 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

The Minutes of the UTAS Council meeting on 10 November 2017 include:

(NB: To view, see pages 164-165 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

Taking all these references in the UTAS Council Minutes together, along with the Mercury article on VC Rathjen, it seems clear that during 2017, VC Rathjen (the head of management and a member of the BEIC) and Chancellor Field oversaw the development of three options for the future of UTAS’ southern campus and eight principles against which the options were considered (both processes commencing in earnest in March 2017).

If the Southern Future Business Case considered by the UTAS Council at its meeting of 5 April 2019 is a guide, as may reasonably be assumed, the eight principles were:

(NB: To view, see page 7 of the pdf of the Southern Future Business Case. I am only interested in the principles here. The survey respondent feedback was supposedly drawn from the 2018 engagement process, which is described Appendix 2 of the Southern Future Business case. I sought more detailed information on the engagement process through an RTI application to UTAS on 12 April 2022. This matter is currently with the Ombudsman.)

These principles were always likely to favour a move to the Hobart CBD, particularly given UTAS’ spurious, but unchallenged claim in 2017, that CBD relocation would greatly increase student accessibility and numbers.

As will be readily apparent, the weight of the presentation and discussion at the UTAS Council’s meeting of 10 November 2017 also strongly favoured a move to the CBD. When taken together, the two UTAS Council’s decisions which conclude the excerpt from the UTAS Council Minutes of 10 November approve development of:

a masterplan business case, including a detailed financial and socio-economic analysis, for the Hobart CBD campus and the future use [read sale/leasing] of the Sandy Bay campus so an informed decision can be made about the future of the southern campus, with the analysis to include a comparison against a realistic alternative.”

Detail is only sought for the Hobart CBD campus option and the last clause almost reads like an afterthought (perhaps insisted upon by one or two UTAS Council members). It may give UTAS’ subsequent decision-making process a patina of respectability, but it seems clear that the dice had been well and truly loaded towards a final decision to move to the Hobart CBD by this stage.

Pre-emptive actions by UTAS ahead of a decision on the location of UTAS’ southern campus

This view is supported by a number of sale, lease and purchase decisions made by the UTAS Council throughout 2017. Many of these decisions seem to presume that the southern campus would be relocated to the Hobart CBD and should have waited on an even-handed consideration of options.

These entries are from the BEIC Report provided to the UTAS Council meeting of 31 March 2017:

(NB: To view, see page 126 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

(NB: To view, see pages 127-128 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

At the UTAS Council meeting of 19 May 2017, under the BEIC Report item:

(NB: To view, see page 133 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

The minutes for the UTAS Council meeting of 30 June 2017 include:

(NB: To view, see page 141 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

This decision was not only pre-emptive but acted to run-down the facilities at Sandy Bay. This has been an ongoing strategy by UTAS.

At the UTAS Council meeting of 8 December 2017, under the Chief Operating Officer’s Report item, this is recorded:

(NB: To view, see page 178 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

Appointment of VC Rathjen’s successor

For the sake of completeness, I am including here those parts of the UTAS Council Minutes of 2017 that relate to the appointment of VC Rathjen’s successor.

This is an excerpt from the UTAS Council Minutes of 30 June 2017:

(NB: To view, see page 139 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

What does “continuity” mean in this context? It is clear that by 2017, VC Rathjen’s duties were largely focused on a CBD move, so I think this must be part of the answer.

  • I have not been able to confirm whether the UTAS Council reviewed the draft selection criteria.

At the UTAS Council meeting of 11 August 2017, under Members Only items:

(NB: To view, see page 153 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

There is then a curious gap in the Minutes until the UTAS Council meeting of 10 November 2017, where this is recorded under the Members Only item:

(NB: To view, see page 164 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes)

We need to talk about Rufus – Part 2Preview

While release of a fuller set of UTAS Council Minutes has added to the fullness of the picture, it has been clear to me for some time that VC Rathjen was the principal architect of UTAS’ proposed CBD move and that the process leading to the UTAS Council’s decision of 5 April 2019 to move to the Hobart CBD was well underway by the time of Rufus Black’s appointment as VC.

The issue then is what exactly Rufus Black ‘brought to the table’.

On 11 August 2022, I submitted an RTI application to UTAS seeking to explore the extent to which willingness to implement what I am now calling the Rathjen-Field-Hodgman-Hickey plan may have been a factor in the interview and selection process for his replacement. I was also interested in whether VC Black questioned the plan in any way on his arrival at UTAS.

I will discuss the information I obtained through my RTI application in We need to talk about Rufus – Part 2.

2 Comments

  1. The format of the UTAS Council minutes is shocking. We can surmise that the members mainly endorse decisions made by Senior Management. If not, the discussion is not recorded.

  2. I think it’s correct that the UTAS Council mainly (I would suggest “almost invariably”) endorse the decisions of Senior Management. If you look at the Southern Strategy item on 10 November 2017, the discussion is anonymised, but there are some cross-currents apparent. However, when it comes to dissent, criticism or questioning, I have only identified one person doing this in the Minutes so far, Prof Jamie Kirkpatrick (I still have 300+ pages to work through out of the 513 released).

    This indicates that far more important than the skill sets identified for the governing bodies of universities in the University Chancellors’ Voluntary Code of Best Practice for the Governance of Australian Public Universities, or UTAS’ own ridiculous internal guidelines (eg regional location as a skill), are a critical/inquiring mind. Part of the problem also comes back to a flawed concept of accountability and a blinkered interpretation of the UTAS Act section 9(2), which states:

    Role and powers of the Council.
    (2) The Council is to act in all matters concerning the University in the way it considers will best advance the interests of the University.

    This has clearly been taken by some UTAS Council members as a reason or excuse for an unquestioning attitude to management recommendations (and for the cone of silence that operates outside of the Council).

    UTAS Council members also need to be mindful of Sections 11A and 11B of the UTAS Act. Part of Section 11A reads:

    11A. Obligation for care and diligence
    (2) A member of the Council is to exercise his or her powers and discharge his or her duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if he or she –
    (a) were a member of the Council in the Council’s circumstances; and
    (b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the Council as, the member.

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