Pictured above: UTAS VC Rufus Black and former Labor Premier, and former Chancellor of UTAS, Michael Field

Key Points

On 5 April 2019, the UTAS Council made its – totally flawed – decision to relocate UTAS’ southern campus from Sandy Bay to the Hobart CBD. (On UTAS’ flawed decision making, see Appendix 1).

However, several years before the UTAS Council’s decision, disgraced former Vice-Chancellor (VC) Peter Rathjen and Chancellor Michael Field, the former Labor Premier, set in train a decision making process with the ‘dice carefully loaded’ towards the CBD outcome, and also initiated a series of actions that pre-empted the UTAS Council’s decision, including extensive property acquisitions in the CBD.

On 10 November 2017 the UTAS Council agreed to announce the decision of its selection committee (chaired by Michael Field) to appoint Rufus Black as the successor to VC Rathjen (see page 164 of the pdf of the 2015-18 Council Minutes).

A story on the ABC on 11 November 2017 on Rufus Black’s appointment as VC included this quote:

“Professor Black said he wanted to make Tasmania more prosperous and is backing plans to continue moving the UTAS Sandy Bay campus into the city.”

Like VC Rathjen and Mr Field’s ‘dice loading’ activities, Rufus Black’s statement clearly pre-empted the UTAS Council’s 5 April 2019 decision, and it cannot be taken as slip of the tongue or misreporting.

Documents obtained under Right to Information (RTI) confirm that when Rufus Black came into office as VC in March 2018 it was with a mandate to drive UTAS’ relocation to the CBD.

These same RTI documents also further underline questions over the extent to which VC Black owed his selection as VC in part, or even entirely, to his willingness to drive CBD relocation, irrespective of its merits.

In the absence of a selection report or details of Rufus Black’s rivals for the position of VC (documents that, based on my experience with UTAS and knowledge of RTI law, I believe there is little hope of ever obtaining) there can be no definitive answer. However, the documents obtained under RTI do indicate that VC’s Black’s willingness to pursue a CBD move was, at the least, a factor in his selection as VC – and probably a major factor.

This view is supported by Rufus Black’s lack of qualifications for a VC position. For instance, in his submission to the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992, Emeritus Distinguished Professor Jeffrey Malpas stated:

“The [UTAS] Act specifies that the Vice-Chancellor is “the chief academic” as well as the executive officer of the University (Division 4, §16[2]) (the Vice-Chancellor thus takes the title of “professor”). However, the position of Vice-Chancellor is no longer associated with any significant teaching or research role, with the position being entirely corporate or managerial in its orientation (the “academic” designation has thus become purely nominal). Moreover, the current Vice-Chancellor [Black] has not only never been a Head of Discipline, Head of School, or Dean, but has limited experience as a teacher or postgraduate supervisor, and his research profile is far below what would normally be expected even of a senior lecturer, let alone anyone of professorial rank. The current Chancellor [Alison Watkins, successor to Mr Field] appears to have no significant academic experience or expertise – although she, like the current Vice-Chancellor, was previously a partner at McKinsey and Company.” (Professor Malpas’ submission, page 12)

As I have long argued in my posts, VC Black’s tenure has been a disaster for UTAS and Tasmania, and he has himself been a divisive figure. If current rumours are correct, and VC Black is seeking a job elsewhere, and he is successful in his search, it will be critical to ensure the selection process for his successor is of high integrity and fully transparent.

VC Black’s successor should come with a willingness to examine ‘from scratch’ the big issues confronting UTAS, an ability to get beyond cliche in thought and speech, strong academic credentials, honesty, a commitment to full transparency by UTAS and a genuine willingness to listen to staff, students and the community.


RTI documents

Having doubts about the selection of Rufus Black as VC, on 11 August 2022, I submitted an RTI application to UTAS seeking documents to enable me explore the extent to which willingness to implement the Rathjen-Field CBD relocation plan was a factor in the interview and selection process for VC Rathjen’s replacement. As a key part of this, I was interested in whether VC Black questioned the Rathjen-Field plan in any way on his arrival at UTAS, as might reasonably have been expected from a competent and open-minded new Chief Executive (VC).

To this end, I specifically requested that UTAS provide:

“(1) the names of the members of the selection panel that chose Rufus Black as VC of UTAS

(2) selection documentation, including – but not limited to – the public advertisement for the VC position, the job description, the selection criteria, interview questions and any assessment tools used

(3) briefs provided to Rufus Black as the incoming or new VC….

(4) any requests by Rufus Black for additional briefing material and such briefing material as this [gave] rise to. I particularly seek any material that may indicate that Rufus Black sought to form his own appraisal of VC Rathjen’s plan to move UTAS to the Hobart CBD.”

In Appendix 2, I provide a copy of UTAS’ decision letter and the documents it provided in response to my RTI application.

In Appendix 3, I provide a copy of my request to UTAS for an internal review of its primary decision. This request sets out my concerns about UTAS’ decision letter and the documents provided at length. However, I particularly note the following points from my request for internal review:

  • The selection panel was chaired by the Chancellor of UTAS, Mr Field. Apart from Mr Field, the panel included “[UTAS] Council members, higher education sector representation, a state government representative, and a commercial sector representative”, however UTAS exempted their names from release, on highly questionable grounds.

  • The UTAS decision-maker stated that “There [was] no record of the interview questions for either the first or second rounds of [VC selection] interviews. At the second round of interviews which were held in person candidates were given advance notice to prepare a 20 minute verbal presentation and following the presentation, the Panel asked questions.” This claimed gap in UTAS’ records is astounding for an organisation of its size, and questions need to be asked how and why UTAS apparently lost the questions.

  • In response to my specific request for any briefing material indicating that “Rufus Black sought to form his own appraisal of VC Rathjen’s plan to move UTAS to the Hobart CBD”, UTAS’ decision-maker stated unequivocally that he had “not found any information.” This strongly indicates that, from the time of his appointment, VC Black was intent on executing the Rathjen-Filed plan for relocation of UTAS’ southern campus to the Hobart CBD from Sandy Bay and that, at no stage, did he consider other options. I consider this derelict on the part of a new VC, who should form their own views on key matters, based on evidence.

  • In response to my request for “briefs provided to Rufus Black as the incoming or new VC”, UTAS’ decision- maker identified, but inappropriately exempted from release in their entirety, four briefs provided to VC Black when he assumed office, namely:
    • Document 2 – Attachment A – COO Structure and Priorities [The COO is the Chief Operating Officer, at this time David Clerk]
    • Document 3 – Commercial Strategy Unit – 2018 Initiatives
    • Documents 5 – Transformation VC Critical Issues brief [Transformation in UTAS jargon is the proposed CBD move, and redevelopment of the Sandy Bay campus site]
    • Document 6 – Transformation VC Critical Issues brief Attachment 1

From the specific terms of my RTI application, and the titles of the four documents (particularly 5 and 6), it is clear that the content of the withheld documents went to the heart of the future of the southern campus of UTAS and, possibly, its impact on its surrounding areas.

It is also likely that the documents show the extent to which UTAS management was operating in a fashion pre-emptive of UTAS Council’s relocation decision on 5 April 2019.

I also note that in its decision letter UTAS’ decision-maker stated that:

“The appointment of Rufus Black as the Vice-Chancellor is not to my knowledge a matter of any controversy or public debate.”

To which I responded:

“While UTAS’ [RTI decision maker] may not be aware of it, the appointment of Professor Black as Vice-Chancellor is a matter of considerable controversy and public debate. For example, on page 12 of his submission to the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992, Emeritus Professor Jeff Malpas raises significant questions about Rufus Black’s qualifications for the position of VC. Beyond this, it is widely believed within the community that Rufus Black’s selection as VC owed significantly to his willingness to implement VC Rathjen’s plan to move UTAS to the Hobart CBD.”

Why I did not pursue the VC selection process further

In response to my internal review request, UTAS’ review decision-maker did not appear to take serious account of my internal review application and did not vary the decision of UTAS’ primary decision-maker in any way (see UTAS letter of 13 December 2022).

Accordingly, I have been asked several times why I did not seek external review of UTAS’ decision and provided documentation by the Ombudsman. The answer is twofold:

(1) By the time I received UTAS’ internal review decision, I had several other review applications on UTAS RTI decisions on foot with the Ombudsman, several of which had been granted priority consideration, and I did not want to jeopardise the quickest possible processing of these.

(2) Based on already significant experience dealing with UTAS over RTI applications at that time, I judged that some of the issues raised by UTAS’ decision and the documents provided would be difficult to pursue in external review. For instance, if UTAS said it could not find the VC selection interview questions, how could this ever be disproved?

I have also been asked why I did not publish the documents I had obtained on VC selection in 2022. The answer is that I did start writing a blog post in order to do this, but was swamped by an ever increasing flow of documents from UTAS, due to the intervention of the Ombudsman, which went to the core of UTAS’ flawed CBD relocation and (subsequent) Sandy Bay redevelopment decisions. With UTAS’ move to the CBD and redevelopment of its Sandy Bay campus seemingly imminent, I gave priority to highlighting the flawed nature of these decisions.

Now, as UTAS continues to stumble its way towards disaster, and there are rumours that VC Black is looking for another job, it seems highly pertinent to look closely at the 2017 selection process.


Appendix 1 – UTAS’ flawed decision making

UTAS recently submitted a Business Case to the Commonwealth Government seeking funding for a revamped STEM precinct at Sandy Bay. As I indicated in the article in The Mercury below, the Business Case highlighted flaws in UTAS’ previous decisions, including the Southern Future Business Case, which was the basis for the UTAS Council’s decision on 5 April 2019 to relocate UTAS’ southern campus from Sandy Bay to the Hobart CBD. (For an easier to read copy of my article, click here).

Apart from this article, many of my previous blog posts have looked at UTAS’ flawed decision making in detail, both in terms of process and the quality of analysis considered.

On process, see particularly: We need to talk about Rufus, Group think or fait accompli? – The UTAS Council’s decision to move to the CBD, VC Black’s coup complete – Chancellor Watkins abrogates the UTAS Council’s authority, Newly released records show UTAS consultation on CBD move was a farce, UTAS’ Strategic Plan Refresh Fails to Address Tasmanian Student Brain Drain

On UTAS’ Southern Future Business Case, the plan for development of the Sandy Bay campus site as a mini-suburb, and UTAS’ poor cost estimation see: UTAS’ proposed CBD relocation would lead to financial disaster – stop the move now!, Tasmanians would bear cost of UTAS folly – $4 billion plus at stake, Deloitte reports should sound death knell for UTAS relocation, A UTAS move to the Hobart CBD would cost at least $1.19 billion more than refurbishment of the Sandy Bay campus, Senior UTAS officer misled Public Accounts Committee

I also have major misgivings on UTAS’ plans for new STEM facilities at Sandy Bay, and whether those plans are serious, and will be writing on this further, but for now see: VC Black’s cynical $500 million STEM con job, Correspondence with the Premier (and Minister Ogilvie). The best option for STEM, Humanities and Business and Commerce is refurbishment/upgrading of current Sandy Bay facilities, which is affordable within UTAS’ current resources, if it sells its CBD properties. (For the avoidance of doubt, this does not mean reversing CBD moves initiated before 2015, such as the Hedberg and Menzies buildings).

Of note, Mr Field defended the proposed move to the CBD, which he sees as his legacy, in his evidence to the Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the University of Tasmania Act 1992 (the LegCo Inquiry) on 27 February 2023. Viewers can judge his performance, perhaps kindly described to me as “vapid, arrogant, bullying and self-serving”, for themselves by clicking here.


Appendix 2 – UTAS’ decision letter and documents provided on VC selection

Initial-Decision-VC


Appendix 3 – my internal review application

Review-Application-VCBy : Robert Hogan